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Abstract—In this paper, we discuss a general methodology 
for analysis and modeling of trust relationships in 
distributed computing. We discuss the classification of trust 
relationships, categorize trust relationships into two layers 
and provide a hierarchy of trust relationships based on a 
formal definition of trust relationship. We provide 
guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships. We review operations on trust relationships 
and relative types of trust relationships in our previous 
work. We provide a set of definitions for the properties of 
direction and symmetry of trust relationships.  In order to 
analyze and model the scope and diversity of trust 
relationship, we define trust scope label. We provide some 
example scenarios to illustrate the proposed definitions 
about properties of trust relationship. All the definitions 
about the properties of trust relationships are elements of 
the taxonomy framework of trust relationships. We discuss 
the lifecycle of trust relationships that includes the analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships, trust relationships at 
runtime, and change management of trust relationships. We 
propose a trust management architecture at high level to 
place the analysis and modeling of trust relationships under 
the background of trust management.  
 
Index Terms—trust relationship, properties of trust 
relationship, life cycle of trust relationship, trust 
management, distributed information system 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers have realized that trust has immense 
significance in distributed computing. There are a lot of 
researches to study or model trust across different areas. 
The notion of trust has been around for many decades in 
different disciplines in different disguises. In security, the 
concept of “trusted systems” has been around explicitly at 
least since late 1970s [1, 2].  Trust is used in the concept 
of convincing observers that a system is correct and 
secure. Following this concept, Trusted Computing Base 
and Trusted Platform become hot topics for both 
academic and industry people.  Trust is a complex subject 
relating to belief or perception of the trusted entity [3]. 
Some researchers have tried to formalize trust as a 
computational concept such as S. Marsh [4] and A. 
Jøsang et al [5, 6]. There are many services and 
applications that must accommodate appropriate notions 
of trust and related elements of trust such as community 
reputation and security credentials. Reputation-based 
systems such as XREP [7], NICE [8] and P-Grid [9] 
provide facility to compute the reputation of an involved 
entity by aggregating the perception of other entities in 
the system. Some reputation systems like TrustNet[10] 
and NodeRanking[11] utilize existing social relationships 
to compute reputations based on various parameters. 
There are many trust management systems based on 
credentials. Public key certificates X.509 and PGP use 
credentials to deal with trust management problem. As a 
further step, M. Blaze et al firstly identified trust 
management as a distinct and important component of 
security in distributed environments and proposed 
PolicyMaker [12]. After that, several automated trust 
management systems have been proposed and 
implemented including PolicyMaker[12], KeyNote[13] 
and REFEREE [14]. All the above systems use 
credentials as evidence of required trust. Normally, there 
are credential verification and secure application policies 
to restrict access to resources and services [15].  Several 
automated trust negotiation systems have been proposed 
[16-18]. Automated trust negotiation is the approach to 
establishing trust between strangers through iterative 
disclosure of digital credentials. 
Trust plays an important role in distributed information 
systems. The properties of trust and how to define/model 
trust relationships are important concerns in the analysis 
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and design of distributed information systems. Actually, 
there is no consensus in the literature on what trust is. 
Though trust has been a foundational stone for security, it 
has been a difficult concept to define clearly. In order to 
reflect many of the commonly used notions of trust, we 
outlined a formal definition of trust relationship in our 
previous work [19]. In order to have a clear 
understanding of trust relationships, it is desirable to have 
taxonomy framework for describing and categorizing 
trust relationships. The taxonomy framework will reflect 
the different forms of trust relationships based on their 
specific characteristics. Based on the formal definition, 
we build up a taxonomy framework where a range of 
useful trust relationships can be expressed and compared. 
The formal definition of trust relationship provides corner 
stone and starting point to analyze both commonly used 
and some unique trust notions that arise in distributed 
computing. Our main objective of this research is to 
develop a sound understanding of trust and create a 
powerful set of tools to analyze and model trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. Our 
target is to achieve a general methodology for analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems.  
Based on the results of our previous research [19], this 
paper discusses the general methodology for analysis and 
modeling of trust relationships in distributed computing.  
After we review the definition of trust relationship and 
discuss the classification of trust relationships, we 
provide guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems.  For the 
properties of trust relationships, we review some results 
about operations on trust relationships and relative types 
of trust relationships in our previous work [19] and 
provide a set of definitions to define the properties of 
direction and symmetry of trust relationships and the 
properties of scope and diversity of trust relationship. We 
discuss the lifecycle of trust relationships that includes 
the analysis and modeling of trust relationships, trust 
relationships at runtime, and the change management of 
trust relationships. We propose trust management 
architecture based on our current understanding of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. In this 
paper, we only provide some high level results of the trust 
management architecture.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, we provide the formal definition of trust 
relationship. In Section III, we discuss the classification 
of trust relationships. We categorize trust relationships 
into two layers and provide a trust relationship hierarchy 
based on our formal definition of trust relationship. In 
Section IV, we outline some guidelines for the analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems. In Section V, we discuss the 
properties of trust relationships. Operations on trust 
relationships and relative types of trust relationships are 
defined. We define the properties about the direction and 
symmetry of trust relationship and the properties about 
the scope and diversity of trust relationship. Some 
scenario examples are provided in this section. In Section 
VI, we discuss the lifecycle of trust relationships. In 
Section VII, we provide a trust management architecture. 
Finally Section VIII provides some concluding remarks.  
II.  DEFINITION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
Trust is a very general concept which can be used in 
different context. In information technology, it is 
desirable to have a formal definition for trust that can be 
used for the purpose of computing. We have given a 
formal definition of trust relationship with a strict 
mathematical structure in our previous work [19]. This 
definition of trust relationship has a broad expressive 
power and it is the cornerstone of our trust taxonomy 
framework. All trust notions discussed in this paper are 
based on this definition. The definition of trust 
relationship is expressed as: 
 
Definition 1: A trust relationship is a four-tuple T =< R, 
E, C, P > where: 
– R is the set of trusters. It contains all the involved 
trusters. It is a non empty set. 
– E is the set of trustees. It contains all the involved 
trustees. It is a non-empty set. 
–  C is the set of conditions. It contains all conditions 
(requirements) for the current trust relationship. 
Normally, a trust relationship has some specified 
conditions. If there is no condition, the condition set 
is empty. 
– P is the set of properties. The property set describes 
the actions or attributes of the trustees. It is a non-
empty set. The property set can be divided into two 
sub sets: 
• Action set: the set of actions that trusters trust 
that trustees will and can perform. 
• Attribute set: the set of attributes that trusters 
trust that trustees have. 
 
The formal definition of trust relationship can reflect 
the commonly used notions of trust and provides a 
taxonomy framework. When trust relationships are used, 
the full syntax (four-tuple < R, E, C, P > must be 
followed. Trust relationship T means that under the 
condition set C, truster set R trust that trustee set E have 
the properties in set P. The definition of trust relationship 
provides a starting point for capturing different forms of 
commonly understood notions of trust. The above strict 
definition of the trust relationship is the basis for all 
properties of trust relationships and it is the starting point 
for the general methodology for analysis and modeling of 
trust in distributed information systems.  
III.  CLASSIFICATION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
Some researchers have tried to identify different forms 
of trust relationships. T. Grandison et al [20] have given a 
bottom-up classification and used the terms as resources 
access trust, service provision trust, certification trust, 
delegation trust and infrastructure trust. From the view 
point of establishment or evaluation of trust relationships, 
all the above trust types must build on a more basic trust 
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relationship that is the authentication trust or identity 
trust. We will categorize trust relationships into two 
layers. Authentication trust is on layer one and other 
types are on layer two.  
Authentication has continuously been an important 
topic in information security community. There are many 
popular authentication schemes such as X.509 and PGP. 
Authentication trust belongs to a separate layer and all 
other trust types belong to another layer above the 








Fig. 1. Trust Layers 
 
Note that trust types of layer two may not be 
necessarily specified in terms of an identity. Anonymous 
authorization belongs to access trust and it is an example 
that there is no specified identity. Anonymous 
authorization can be implemented using certificates with 
capabilities. The real identity of the involved trustee will 
not be revealed. For example, a customer has a certificate 
for accessing some resources on the Internet. The 
customer’s behaviors of accessing the resources can be 
recorded. If it is desirable that the customer cannot be 
identified, the related access trust is a kind of anonymous 
access trust. Particularly for the resource access trust and 
service provision trust, the anonymous authentication is 
desirable in some cases. In such a situation, the layer of 
authentication still needs to provide a mechanism to deal 
with the same entity as the trustee in the whole scope of 
the trust process. Normally, there is a temporary and 
dynamic identification which will be uniquely connected 
with the involved trustee in the scope of the trust process.  
At layer two, trust relationships can be classified in 
different ways. In the following, we will give another 
kind of classification which is different from the bottom-
up classification of trust. Based on the strict definition of 
trust relationship, trust relationships at layer two can be 
classified according to the nature of the trustees in trust 
relationship < R, E, C, P >. If E is an infrastructure, the 
trust relationship belongs to infrastructure trust. If E is 
not an infrastructure, the trust relationship belongs to 
non-infrastructure trust. Non-infrastructure trust 
relationships can be classified based on the ownership of 
the property set. If the trusters have the ownership of the 
property set, the trust relationship belongs to access trust. 
If the trustees have the ownership of the property set, the 
trust relationship belongs to provision trust. If some 
properties are owned by trustees and some other 
properties are owned by trusters, then the trust 
relationship belongs to mixture (A&P) trust. The 
hierarchy of trust relationships at layer two is illustrated 
in Figure 2. In such a classification, delegation trust and 
certification trust are not independent types. The 
delegation trust is a special form of provision trust, 
trustees are the providers of delegated decisions on 
behalves of trusters. A certification trust can be any 
subtype of non-infrastructure trust based on the nature of 
its property set. 
 
  Infrastructure Trust 
 
   Trust Relationship                              Access Trust 
 
  Non-infrastructure Trust          Provision Trust 
   
                                  Mixture (A&P) Trust 
 
Fig. 2. Trust Relationship Hierarchy 
IV. GUIDELINES FOR ANALYSIS AND MODELING OF TRUST 
RELATIONSHIPS IN DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Trust relationships between possible entities play 
crucial roles in distributed computing. Analysis and 
modeling of trust relationships requires identification of 
sometimes subtle trust assumptions and normally it is a 
challenging task. The analysis and modeling of trust 
relationship must be integrated with other requirements of 
the whole distributed information systems. With the life 
cycle of the development of a distributed information 
system, the modeling, implementing and maintaining of 
trust relationships is an incremental, iterative process. 
The life cycle of trust relationships share the following 
basic steps although the details and the ordering of the 
steps may be changed in some cases. 
 
1. Extract trust requirements in system. 
2. Identify possible trust relationships from trust 
requirements. 
3. Choose the whole set of trust relationships from 
possible trust relationships. 
4. Refine the whole set of trust relationships. 
5. Implement the whole set of trust relationships. 
6. Maintain all the trust relationships in system. 
 
Trust requirements and trust assumptions belong to the 
business requirements of an information system. The 
analysis of business requirements is not the main concern 
of this paper. Any way, our strict definition of trust 
relationship and the properties of trust relationship 
discussed and defined in the following section are helpful 
to understand the possible trust issues and requirements.  
How to define and maintain a good set of trust 
relationships is one of the most important tasks of the 
trust management in system analysis, system design, 
implementation and maintenance. The follows are some 
high level guidelines for the modeling and design of 
quality trust relationships in distributed information 
systems. 
 
1. Completeness: The completeness means that all 
trust relationships defined in the system can capture 
all of trust requirements in the information system. 
2. Sufficiency: The trust relationships defined in an 
information system provide suitable level of 
abstraction to permit meaningful and efficient usage 
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information system. If possible, a trust relationship 
had better have more coverage and the total number 
of trust relationships in the system can be reduced. 
3. High Cohesion: A trust relationship has a narrow 
mission. It had better be meaningful and easy to be 
understood. The trust relationship itself has some 
inherent maintainability. When the high cohesion 
and sufficiency of more coverage conflict with each 
other, there is trade-off between them. 
4. Primitiveness: In an ideal system, all the trust 
relationships defined and used in the system are 
primitive trust relationships (primitive trust 
relationship will be defined in Section V). There is 
no information redundancy.   
 
The analysis and modeling of the whole set of trust 
relationships in a distributed information system is one 
part of the analysis and design of the whole system and 
they are dependent on or strongly coupled with the design 
of other parts of the system. Normally, the analysis and 
modeling of whole set of trust relationships is quite 
complicated. The process has an incremental and iterative 
life cycle. The initial set of trust relationships will be 
smoothed and refined in multiple life cycles in the terms 
of completeness, sufficiency, high cohesion and 
primitiveness. However, these guidelines are at a very 
high level and they are suitable for any task of analysis 
and design in information systems. Definitely, they have 
not touched the specific characteristics of trust in 
distributed information systems.  In order to better 
understand the specific trust issues and situations and 
provide suitable terms and tools to analyze and model 
trust relationships, we need to study and define the 
properties of trust relationships from different angles.  
The goal of the general methodology for analysis and 
modeling of trust relationships in distributed computing is 
to help in the design, implementation and maintenance of 
a distributed information system by highlighting the trust 
issues inherent to the system.  The general methodology 
will provide not only guidelines but also terms and tools 
for the analysis and modeling trust relationships in 
distributed information systems. To achieve the above 
target, we need to study the properties of trust 
relationships from different angles. We will provide a 
taxonomy framework of trust which includes important 
properties of trust relationships in distributed information 
systems. These properties include classification of trust, 
the relations of trust relationships, direction and 
symmetry of trust relationship, scope and diversity of 
trust relationship and life cycle of trust relationship. We 
will provide a set of definitions and operations for the 
properties of trust relationships. These definitions and 
operations can enable users to better understand the 
specific trust issues and situations. From the view point 
of system analysis and design, they can provide suitable 
terms and helpful tools to enable the analysis, modeling, 
implementation and maintenance of trust relationships in 
distributed information systems. 
V. PROPERTIES OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
In this section, we will discuss the properties of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. We will 
provide a set of operations and definitions for the 
properties of trust relationships. These operations and 
definitions can be used as enabling tools in the analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems. We will provide scenario examples 
to show readers how to understand and use the proposed 
definitions about the properties of trust relationships in 
the real world. 
A.  Operations on Trust Relationships 
In this sub section, we provide a set of operations on 
trust relationships. From the nature of trust relationship 
and its mathematical structure, some new trust 
relationships can be derived based on the existing trust 
relationships. The operations of using two existing trust 
relationships to generate a new trust relationship under 
specific constraints and operations of decomposing one 
existing trust relationship into two new trust relationships 
under specific constraints are defined as follows:  
 
Operation 1:  Let T1 = ( R1 , E1 , C1 , P1)  and  T2 = ( R2 , 
E2 , C2 , P2). There is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C1 U 
C2, P1 U P2). If R1 ∩ R2 = Φ or E1 ∩ E2 = Φ, T = Φ.  
 
If R1 = R2 and E1 = E2, the operation becomes:  
 
Operation 1A: Let T1 = (R, E, C1, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C2, 
P2). There is a set T = (R, E, C1 U C2, P1 U P2).  
 
If R1 = R2, E1 = E2 and C1 = C2, the operation becomes:  
 
Operation 1B: Let T1 = (R, E, C, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C, 
P2). There is a set T = (R, E, C, P1 U P2). 
 
Operation 2: Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, 
P). There is a set T = (R1 U R2, E1 ∩ E2, C, P). 
 
If E1 = E2, the operation becomes: 
 
Operation 2A: Let T1 = (R1, E, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E, C, 
P). There is a set T = (R1 U R2, E, C, P). 
 
Operation 3: Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, 
P). There is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 U E2, C, P). 
 
If R1 = R2, the operation becomes: 
 
Operation 3A: Let T1 = (R, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R, E2, C, 
P). There is a set T = (R, E1 U E2, C, P). 
 
Operation 4: Let T = < R, E, C, P>.  If there are R1, R2 
and R = R1 U R2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R1, 
E, C, P> and T2 = <R2, E, C, P>. 
 
Operation 5: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are E1, E2 
and E = E1 U E2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R, 
E1, C, P> and T2 = <R, E2, C, P>. 
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Operation 6: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are P1, P2 
and P = P1 U P2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R, E, 
C, P1> and T2 = <R, E, C, P2>. 
 
This operation has the following special case: 
 
Operation 6A: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are P1, P2, 
C1, C2 and P = P1 U P2, C = C1 U C2, If C1 is the 
condition set for P1 and C2 is the condition set for P2, 
there are trust relationships T1 = <R, E, C1, P1> and T2 
= <R, E, C2, P2>. 
 
The above operations can be used to generate new trust 
relationships from the existing trust relationships under 
some specific constrains. The Operation 1 deals with any 
two trust relationships and a new trust relationship is 
possibly generated (if the result is not Φ). The Operation 
1A, 1B, 2A and 3A deal with how to use two trust 
relationships to generate one trust relationship under 
some specific constraints. Operation 4, 5, 6 and 6A deal 
with how to decompose one trust relationship into two 
trust relationships under some specific constraints. 
Operation 1A and Operation 6A are inverse operations. 
Operation 1B and Operation 6 are inverse operations. 
Operation 2A and Operation 4 are inverse operations. 
Operation 3A and Operation 5 are inverse operations. 
 
B. Relative Types of Trust Relationships 
In this sub section, we will discuss the relative types of 
trust relationships. We will define the equivalent, 
primitive, derived, direct redundant and alternate trust 
relationships. We will classify the direct redundant trust 
relationships into different types.  
 
Definition 2: Let T1 =< R1, E1, C1, P1 > and T2 =< R2, 
E2, C2, P2 >. If and only if R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 = 
C2 and P1 = P2, then T1 and T2 are equivalent, in 
symbols: 
 
T1 = T2   R1=R2 and E1=E2 and C1=C2 and P1=P2 
 
Definition 3: If a trust relationship cannot be derived 
from other existing trust relationships, the trust 
relationship is a primitive trust relationship. 
 
Definition 4: If a trust relationship can be derived from 
other existing trust relationships, the trust relationship is 
a derived trust relationship. 
 
Note: when a set of trust relationships are defined in an 
information system, a derived trust relationship is always 
related to one or more other trust relationships in the 
information system. For an independent trust relationship, 
it is meaningless to judge it as a derived trust relationship 
or not. 
 
Definition 5: Let T=<R, E, C, P>. If there is trust 
relationship T' = <R', E', C', P'> and T ≠ T', R R', E   
 E', C   C', P P'. T is a direct redundant trust 
relationship. 
 
We now discuss several special cases of direct redundant 
trust relationships based on the single tuple of trust 
relationship. We believe that these special cases play 
important roles in the analysis and design of trust 
relationships. 
 
TYPE 1: DRLR (Direct Redundant of Less Trusters) 
Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust 
relationship T' = < R', E, C, P> and R'  R, T is a DLR-
redundant trust relationship. 
 
Trust relationship T is DRLR-redundant trust relationship 
means that there is another trust relationship with super 
set of trusters and all other tuples are same as peers in T. 
 
TYPE 2: DRLE (Direct Redundant of Less Trustees) 
Let T=<R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust 
relationship T'=<R, E', C, P>$ and E'  E, T is a DLE-
redundant trust relationship. 
 
Trust relationship T is DRLE-redundant trust relationship 
means that there is another trust relationship with super 
set of trustees and all other tuples are same as peers in T. 
 
TYPE3: DRMC (Direct Redundant of More 
Conditions) 
Let T= <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is an alternate 
trust relationship T' = <R, E, C', P> and C'  C, T is a 
DRMC-redundant trust relationship. 
 
Trust relationship T is DRMC-redundant trust 
relationship means that there is another trust relationship 
with sub set of conditions and all other tuples are same as 
peers in T. 
 
TYPE 4: DRLP (Direct Redundant of Less Properties) 
Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust 
relationship T' = <R, E, C, P'> and P'  P, T is a DRLP-
redundant trust relationship. 
 
T is DRLP trust relationship means that there is another 
trust relationship with super set of properties and all other 
tuples are same as peers in T. 
 
Definition 6: Let T = <R, E, C, P>,  T '= <R, E, C', P> 
and C ≠ C'. T and T' are alternate trust relationships of 
each other. 
 
An alternate trust relationship means that there is an 
alternate condition set for the same truster set, trustee set 
and property set. Perhaps, there are multiple alternate 
trust relationships. In distributed information systems, 
multiple mechanisms and multiple choices are necessary 
in many situations and it is the main reason why we 
define and discuss alternate trust relationships here. 
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Scenario Example I: Consider an online e-commerce 
service called FlightServ, which can provide flight 
booking and travel deals. FlightServ is designed using 
web services. FlightServ connects with customers, 
airlines, hotels and credit card services (some of these 
may also be web services). The whole system could be 
very complicated, but in this example, we only consider 
some basic trust relationships in the system. In the 
system, customers are classified into normal flyers and 
frequent flyers. Originally, some trust relationships are 
modeled as follows: 
 
TS1-1: Airlines trust normal flyers can make their airline 
bookings, if they have address details & confirmed credit 
card information. 
TS1-2: Airlines trust frequent flyers with no condition 
that frequent flyers can make their airline bookings. 
TS1-3: Hotels trust normal flyers can make their hotels 
booking, if they have address details & confirmed credit 
card information. 
TS1-4: Hotels trust frequent flyers can make their hotels 
booking, if they have address details & confirmed credit 
card information. 
TS1-5: Credit card services are trusted by all possible 
entities without any condition that the credit card 
services will give the correct evaluation of credit card 
information. 
TS1-6: Credit card services are trusted by all possible 
entities without any condition that the credit card 
services will keep the privacy of credit card information. 
 
For the above trust relationships in the system, based on 
definitions and operations in section 3, we have the 
following analysis: 
– All above trust relationships are primitive. 
– Using the Operation 3A, trust relationships TS1-3 
and TS1-4 can be merged to a new trust relationship 
TS1- (3)(4): “Hotels trust customers if they have 
address details & confirmed credit card information 
that customers can make their hotels booking”. If 
TS1- (3)(4) has been defined in the system, TS1-3 
and TS1-4 becomes DRLE trust relationships and 
will be removed out of the system. 
– Using the Operation 1B, trust relationships TS1-5 
and TS1-6 can be merged to a new trust relationship 
TS1-(5)(6): “Credit card services are trusted by all 
possible entities without any condition that the credit 
card services will give the correct evaluation of 
credit card information & the credit card services 
will keep the privacy of credit card information”. If 
TS1-(5)(6) has been defined in the system, TS1-5 
and TS1-6 becomes DRLP trust relationships and 
will be removed out of the system. 
 
We hope that the above scenario example can provide 
a general picture for using the operations on trust 
relationships and the relative types of trust relationships 
to analyze and modeling trust relationships in distributed 
information systems.   
In the following sub sections, we will provide more 
definitions about the properties of trust relationship that 
include the direction and symmetry of trust relationship 
and the scope and diversity of trust relationship. 
C. Direction and Symmetry of Trust Relationship 
In this sub section, we will provide a set of definitions 
for the properties of trust direction and trust symmetry. 
The properties of trust direction and trust symmetry play 
an important role in the analysis and modeling of trust 
relation ships in distributed information systems. These 
definitions provide general descriptions about the 
properties of trust direction and trust symmetry. A 
scenario example is provided to illustrate these 
definitions and their usage. We hope that these definitions 
can cover most situations in the real world and can be 
used as standard scenarios for analyzing and modeling 
trust relationships about properties of direction and 
symmetry. In real systems, one or multiple kinds of trust 
direction and trust symmetry can be chosen based on the 
specified requirements of the information systems. 
The properties of trust direction and symmetry are 
related to each other and they should be cooperatively 
used to analyze and model the properties of direction and 
symmetry of trust relationships in distributed information 
systems. For the properties of trust direction, one-way 
trust relationship, two-way trust relationship and reflexive 
trust relationship are defined. For the properties of trust 
symmetry, symmetric trust relationships, symmetric two-
way trust relationship, and the whole set of trust 
relationships are defined. The details of the definitions 
are described as follows. 
 
Definition 7: One-way trust relationship is the trust 
relationship with a unique trust direction from the 
trusters to trustees. 
 
One-way is the default feature of a trust relationship if 
there is no further description. Two-way trust relationship 
can be defined and used in information systems. Actually, 
two-way trust relationship is the result of binding two 
one-way trust relationships together. We define two-way 
trust relationship as follows: 
 
Definition 8: Two-way trust relationship TT' is the 
binding of two one-way trust relationships T =< R, E, C, 
P > and T' =< R', E', C', P' > with R' = E and E' = R. T 
and T' are the reflective trust relationships with each 
other in the two-way trust relationship. 
 
In the above definition, “binding” is the key word. If 
there are two one-way trust relationships between R and 
E but they are not bound with each other, then they are 
only two one-way trust relationships and there is no two-
way trust relationship. When two one-way trust 
relationships are bound together, there is a two-way trust 
relationship and these two one-way trust relationships can 
be called reflective trust relationships with each other.  
If the trusters and the trustees are the same, the trust 
relationship is reflexive. The reflexive trust relationship is 
defined as follows: 
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Definition 9: Trust relationships T =< R, E, C, P > is a 
reflexive trust relationship when R = E. 
 
The symmetry of two trust relationships could be an 
important concern in the analysis or modeling of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. The 
symmetry of two trust relationships is defined as the 
follows: 
 
Definition 10: If there is trust relationship T' =< R', E', 
C', P' > which is the result of swapping trusters and 
trustees in another trust relationship T =<R, E, C, P > 
(the swapping includes all possible ownerships in 
condition set and property set), there is symmetry 
between T and T', T and T' are symmetric trust 
relationships with each other. 
 
In the above definition, the swapping of trusters and 
trustees includes all possible ownerships in condition set 
and property set. The two trust relationships have the 
same condition set and property set except the possible 
ownerships in them.  
The symmetric/asymmetric two-way trust relationship 
is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 11: A two-way trust relationship TT' is 
symmetric two-way trust relationship if there is symmetry 
between T and T'; otherwise TT' is an asymmetric two-
way trust relationship. 
 
Sometimes it is necessary to discuss the symmetry of 
all trust relationships between a truster set and a trustee 
set, we have the following definition: 
 
Definition 12: WTR(R,E) is the whole set of trust 
relationships with same truster set R and trustee set E. 
 
Definition 13: If every trust relationship in WTR(R,E) 
has a symmetric trust relationship in WTR(E,R) and every 
trust relationship in WTR(E,R) has a symmetric trust 
relationship in WTR(R,E), the trust between R and E are 
symmetric. 
 
Scenario Example II: Here we use Microsoft’s domain 
trust as a regressive scenario example to discuss the 
properties of trust direction and trust symmetry defined in 
this section. Domain trust allows users to authenticate to 
resources in another domain. Also, an administrator is 
able to administer user rights for users in the other 
domain. Our general definitions for the properties of 
direction and symmetry of trust relationships have 
general expressive power and can cover broad range of 
commonly used notations. The related concepts in 
domain trust can be viewed as specific cases of these 
general definitions. In the following, we will use our 
terms defined in this paper to review some concepts in 
domain trust. 
– Based on definition 1 in section 2, the domain trust 
can be expressed as “entities in domain A trust 
entities in domain B without any condition that 
entities in domain B have the right to get access of 
the set of resources in domain A”. 
– Microsoft’s domain trust includes both one-way trust 
and two-way trust. In Microsoft’s domain trust, one-
way trust is defined as a unidirectional authentication 
path created between two domains. This means that 
in a one-way trust between domain A and domain B, 
users in domain A can access resources in domain B. 
However, users in domain B cannot access resources 
in domain A. Microsoft’s one-way trust is an 
example of one-way trust relationship in definition 
7. In a two-way domain trust, authentication requests 
can be passed between the two domains in both 
directions. Two-way trust is an example of two-way 
trust relationship in definition 8. 
– The entities in same domain trust each other without 
any condition that entities have the right to get access 
of the set of resources in the same domain. This is an 
example of reflexive trust relationship in definition 
9. 
– There is symmetry in the two-way domain trust. The 
two one-way trust relationships bound in the two-
way trust relationship are “entities in domain A trust 
entities in domain B without any condition that 
entities in domain B have the right to get access of 
the set of resources in domain A” and “entities in 
domain B trust entities in domain A without any 
condition that entities in domain A have the right to 
get access of the set of resources in domain B”. 
These two one-way trust relationships are symmetric 
trust relationships with each other in definition 10. 
Microsoft’s two-way trust is symmetric two-way 
trust relationship in definition 11. 
– In domain trust, the WTR(A,B) based on definition 
12 has only one trust relationship from truster 
domain A to trustee domain B. For two-way domain 
trust, the trust between domain A and domain B is 
symmetric based on definition 13. 
 
The above definitions about the properties of trust 
direction and trust symmetry are new elements of the 
taxonomy framework about trust. We believe that they 
can cover most situations related with direction and 
symmetry of trust relationship in the real world. These 
definitions can provide suitable terms and can be used as 
scenario examples in the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. 
D. Scope and Diversity of Trust Relationship 
In this sub section, we will discuss the scope and 
diversity of trust relationship in distributed information 
systems. The diversity of trust has been discussed by 
Jøsang [14] who expresses trust in three diversity 
dimensions. The first dimension represents trusters or 
trust originators; the second represents the trust purpose; 
and the third represents trustees. Jøsang uses the term 
trust purpose based on the observation that trust is 
relative to a domain of actions. In our formal definition of 
trust relationship, trusters and trustees are two tuples and 
they are similar to the terms of Jøsang. The origin 
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diversity about trusters and target diversity about trustees 
are straightforward and have been described clearly by 
Jøsang [14]. Jøsang’s term of trust purpose is related to a 
domain of actions. Under our taxonomy framework, we 
will define trust scope label to take the place of the trust 
purpose. There are multiple benefits of trust scope label 
other than the trust purpose and they will be discussed 
later in this sub section. The trust scope label is the 
binding of the condition set and property set based on the 
formal definition of trust relationship. The trust scope 
label is a new element of our taxonomy framework. The 
definition of trust scope label is expressed as follows: 
 
Definition 14: A trust scope label is a two-tuple TSL =< 
C, P > where C is a set of conditions and P is a set of 
properties. 
 
The details of condition set C and property set P can be 
found in the formal definition of trust relationship in 
section 2. Actually, trust scope label provides a new layer 
of abstraction under the trust relationship that only 
includes property set and condition set. To compare two 
trust scope labels TSL1 =< C1, P1 > and TSL2 =< C2, P2 >, 
we have the following rules: 
1. C1  C2 and P1  P2 <=>  TSL1 ≥ TSL2; 
2. C1 = C2 and P1 = P2 <=> TSL1 = TSL2; 
3. C1  C2 and P1  P2 <=> TSL1 ≤ TSL2; 
4. In other cases, TSL1 and TSL2 can not be compared 
with each other. 
 
The trust scope label is beyond the trust purpose in 
several aspects. Trust scope label composes of a subspace 
of trust relationships (two tuples out of four tuples) and 
describes the characteristics of the combination of 
condition set C and property set P. Trust scope labels 
could be treated as an independent subspace of trust 
relationships in the analysis and design of overall 
information systems. The property set in trust scope label 
covers not only actions but also attributes of trustees. 
Two trust scope labels could be compared with each other 
based on the rules provided above. 
 
Scenario Example III: Consider an online software 
shop. We assume that anybody who wants to enter the 
online shop must register as a member of the online shop 
first. For describing the condition set and property set in 
possible trust relationships between the shop and possible 
customers, we use the following notations: 
– p1 stands for that customers can read the 
documentation of the software. 
– p2 stands for that customers can download the 
software. 
– c1 stands for certificate of membership. 
– c2 stands for the commitment of the payment for the 
software. 
– c3 stands for the payment for the software. 
 
We have the following trust scope labels: 
1. TSL1 =< {c1}, {p1} > 
2. TSL2 =< {c1, c2}, {p1, p2} > 
3. TSL3 =< {c1, c2, c3}, {p1, p2} > 
 
Based on the rules to compare two trust scope labels, we 
have 
–  TSL1 cannot be compared with TSL2 (or TSL3). 
There is no obvious relationship between TSL1 and 
TSL2 (or TSL3). 
– TSL2 > TSL3. It means that the trust scope of TSL2 is 
less strict than that of TSL3. 
 
The scope and diversity of trust is another aspect to be 
considered in the analysis and modeling of trust in 
distributed information systems. The trust scope label 
may be quite complicated and the above comparison rules 
provide helpful tools in making judgments. The scope 
and diversity of trust relationship may be coupled with 
other trust properties such as trust direction and trust 
symmetry. 
VI.  LIFECYCLE OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
A trust relationship has a lifecycle in distributed 
information systems. The whole life cycle of trust 
relationships includes several stages such as extracting 
trust requirements in system, identifying possible trust 
relationships from trust requirements, choosing and 
refining the whole set of trust relationships from possible 
trust relationships, implementing trust relationships in 
systems and maintaining trust relationships in systems. 
The life cycle of trust relationships includes three aspects: 
analysis and modeling of trust relationships; trust 
relationships at runtime; and the change management of 
trust relationships.  
A. Analysis and Modelling Trust Relationships 
The general methodology for analysis and modeling of 
trust relationships in distributed information systems is 
the main concern of this paper. As an aspect of lifecycle 
of trust relationships, the analysis and modeling of whole 
set of trust relationships in the system is one part of the 
analysis and design of the whole system and they are 
dependent on or strongly coupled with the design of other 
parts of the system. The analysis and design of trust 
relationships is a quite complicated process.  We need to 
consider different aspects of the trust requirements in the 
target information system. The formal definition of trust 
relationship and the classification of trust relationship 
provide a starting point for the understanding of all trust 
issues. The operations and definitions provided in Section 
V will be used as terms and tools to analyze and model 
different specific properties of trust relationships in 
distributed information systems. The properties of target 
trust relationships are the main concerns to address trust 
requirements in distributed information systems. When 
we analyze a trust relationship, we must concern the 
properties of trust relationships from different angles. The 
operations on trust relationships and relative types of trust 
relationships provide terms and tools to discuss the 
relations between trust relationships. The definitions 
about properties of direction and symmetry of trust 
relationship and properties of scope and diversity of trust 
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relationship provide terms and tools to discuss the related 
properties. All the definitions can be viewed as scenario 
examples in the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships.   
The properties of trust relationships and relations of 
trust relationships will reconsidered in the multiple 
lifecycles of trust relationships. The modeling and 
maintaining of trust relationships is an incremental, 
iterative process. The set of the trust relationships initially 
modeled in an information system will be smoothed and 
refined in the life cycle of the information system to 
address the change of trust requirements or to modify and 
improve the information system.  
The operations and definitions about the properties of 
trust relationships provide a set of tools in the analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships. These operations and 
definitions are based on our current understanding about 
trust relationships. It is possible to define more operations 
and properties. 
B. Trust Relationships at Runtime 
Trust is a vast topic which not only includes the 
analysis and modeling of trust relationships but also 
includes the evaluation and establishment of trust 
relationships at runtime. From the view point of system 
analysis and design, it is convenient to define trust 
relationship with truster set, trustee set, condition set and 
property set as four tuples of the definition of trust 
relationship. There are more arguments about why trust 
relationship is defined based on set of trusters(trustees) 
not on individual truster (trustee) [19]. From the view 
point of system running, trust is always evaluated based 
on one truster, one trustee, a set of condition and a set of 
properties. The set of properties in the evaluation should 
be a subset of property set in a trust relationship. An 
instance of trust relationship is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 15: When trust is evaluated based on trust 
relationship T =< R, E, C, P > at runtime, only one 
truster r, one trustee e and requested properties p will be 
involved. There are r   R, e   E, c ≡ C, p  P. The t 
=< r, e, c, p > is called an instance of trust relationship 
T. 
 
An instance of trust relationship must be assessable at 
runtime. The evaluating decision can be made by the 
involved truster based on the conditions for the trusting of 
the trustee with the set of properties. In Section III, we 
have described the two layers of trust relationships. At 
runtime, the authentication trust on layer one is always 
evaluated at first, then the trust relationship on layer two 
can be evaluated. The trust evaluation is actually to judge 
that the conditions of a trust relationship can be satisfied 
or not. Actually the conditions of trust relationship are 
against different risks. The risks maybe come from 
actions of trustee or third parties and unstable 
environments. All conditions can be classified into two 
subtypes as pre-conditions and post-conditions. Pre-
conditions are existing evidences and they could be 
evidence credentials from trustees, local stored data or 
knowledge of trusters, environmental data, and remote 
data from third parties (maybe community based 
reputation). Post-conditions are post evidences (such as 
non-repudiation or guaranty) that are commitments from 
trusters. At runtime, trust is always between exactly two 
entities. Trust is normally non symmetric, but symmetric 
trust could be defined in specific situations based on 
related definitions about the direction and symmetry of 
trust relationship in Section V  
 
C. Change Management of Trust Relationships 
Normally, trust relationships are not static and it is 
necessary to modify and refine them to reflect the 
changing business requirements. Change management of 
trust relationships focuses on how to introduce or update 
trust relationships in a consistent manner and how to deal 
with the dynamic evolution of trust relationships in 
distributed information systems. Change management of 
trust relationships is related with the analysis and 
modeling, implementation, evolution, and management of 
trust relationships in distributed information systems.  In 
dynamic environments, change management of trust 
relationships is a challenging issue.  
In order to accommodate new business requirements, it 
may be necessary to introduce new trust relationships. 
When new trust relationships are introduced, the change 
management of trust relationships must be considered.  It 
may be necessary to remove some existing trust 
relationships out of the system as well. These new trust 
relationships or removed trust relationships are related 
with some applications. It is possible that these 
applications are executing during the change for 
introducing or removing some trust relationships. There 
are three possible strategies for the related change 
management. The first strategy is to let all the related 
executing applications be completed according to the old 
trust arrangement. The second strategy is to abort all   
related executing applications and restart the applications 
according the new trust arrangement.  The third strategy 
is to allow a migration from the old trust arrangement to 
the new one. There are some conditions for the third 
strategy and it may be very complicated [21]. 
VII.  TRUST MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE 
Our main objective about trust research is to create a 
powerful set of tools to enable trust management in 
distributed information systems. The analysis and 
modeling trust relationships is important in the trust 
management but it is not the end of the whole story. How 
to merge the trust relationships into the overall distributed 
information systems is another important topic and it 
provides lots of challenges. To provide an overall 
solution for trust issues in distributed information 
systems, we are currently working on a trust management 
architecture. The main aim of the trust management 
architecture is to establish infrastructure and tools of trust 
management for developing distributed applications. 
The trust management architecture must support a 
wide range of different context-based trust policies. The 
trust policies are normally task-specific and they may be 
supported by multiple mechanisms. A trust policy can 
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require one or multiple trust relationships. When a trust 
policy is enforced, the required trust relationships in the 
trust policy must be satisfied. The trust decision is 
context-based and it is based on the evaluation of one or 
multiple trust relationships.  
To illustrate trust management architecture, we 
propose TrustEngine to hold all trust related components 
that could be separated from applications. The formal 
definition of trust relationship is the starting point of the 
trust management architecture. TrustEngine could 
address applications' trust requests like a database query 
engine. TrustEngine accepts request with input as a 
trustor, a trustee, a set of conditions, and a set of 
properties which describe the actions or attributes of the 
trustees. Depending on the form of the query, 
TrustEngine can return yes/no answer or additional 
restrictions that would make the trust evaluation possible. 
Trust relationships are defined and loaded into the 
TrustEngine when applications are being developed. At 
runtime, single instance of trust relationship is evaluated. 
TrustEngine is a container for all trust components and 
it has the flexibility to be expanded easily to hold new 
trust components. Each component in TrustEngine 
performs some trust function or has some data storage to 
be used by other trust functions. TrustEngine has 
TrustDatabase for storage of trust related data.  
TrustEngine includes components packages: 
TrustControl, LocatingTrust, EvaluatingTrust and 

















Fig.3. TrustEngine Package Hierarchy 
 
TrustDatabase is the data storage of TrustEngine to 
look after trust relationships and other trust parameters.  
It is necessary for TrustEngine to have a persistent 
storage mechanism for storing and retrieving information 
about trust. The storage mechanism can be relational 
database or data profile. After trust relationships have 
been analyzed and modeled based on trust requirements 
in an information system, these trust relationships must 
be loaded into TrustDatabase before the information 
system is running. There may be other data as trust 
parameters that should be loaded into the TrustDatabase 
as well. At runtime, it may be necessary to store instances 
of trust relationships. 
TrustControl is the package for the overall 
management and control of TrustEngine at run time. 
TrustControl links applications and functional packages 
of TrustEngine (LocatingTrust, EvaluatingTrust and 
ConsumingTrust). 
LocatingTrust is the package for finding the requested 
trust relationship. It receives the request from 
applications and finds the requested trust relationship 
from TrustDatabase.  
EvaluatingTrust contains all computing components 
for the evaluation of a trust relationship. The evaluation 
of a trust relationship is to check that the conditions of a 
trust relationship can be satisfied or not. The conditions 
of a trust relationship are against risks from evil actions 
of trustees, evil actions from other parties, and unstable 
environments. There are different conditions in a trust 
relationship and there may be multiple mechanisms to 
support the trust evaluation. The existing reputation-
based systems and credential based systems can be 
employed as components of trust evaluation. Any 
successful systems or mechanisms for checking or 
evaluating of evidence and reputation can be included in 
EvaluatingTrust. Existing standards and successful 
systems related to trust can be put into the trust 
management architecture easily. EvaluatingTrust has 
functional components for specific evaluating tasks such 
as credential evaluation, reputation evaluation, stored 
data evaluation, and environment evaluation. In real 
implementation, the package of EvaluatingTrust will be 
customized based on the requirements and normally some 
components will not be involved. On the other hand, new 
components may be added to support other mechanisms 
or functions if necessary. 
ConsumingTrust contains the computing components 
for consuming trust. Consuming trust deals with how to 
use the output of the evaluation of a trust relationship. 
The evaluation of a trust relationship is not always be 
consumed immediately. The result of evaluation of trust 
relationship can be stored and distributed in different 
ways. There are three normal ways to use the output of 
trust evaluation. The first way is that the result of trust 
evaluation is immediately used by consuming 
applications. The second way is to generate credentials 
with the result of trust evaluation as input. These 
credentials will be used in the future by the same or other 
applications. The third way is that the result of trust 
evaluation is stored in database and the data will be 
retrieved and used by applications in the future.  
The main concern of this paper is about the analysis 
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems. Trust management architecture is 
the next step target of our research about trust. The details 
of trust management architecture are beyond the scope of 
this paper and they will be described in a separate paper.  
VIII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have discussed the general 
methodology of analysis and modeling of trust 
relationship in distributed information systems. We have 




JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 1, NO. 2, MAY 2006 51
© 2006 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
authentication at layer one of trust relationship and other 
trust relationships on layer two. We have proposed a 
hierarchy of layer two trust relationships based on the 
nature of four tuples of a trust relationship. We provide 
guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships in distributed information systems. We 
review the operations on trust relationships and the 
relative types of trust relationships. We provide a set of 
definitions for the properties of direction and symmetry 
of trust relationships. We define trust scope label to 
model the properties of scope and diversity of trust 
relationships. All the definitions proposed in this paper 
are elements of our taxonomy framework of trust 
relationships and they can be used as enabling tools in the 
analysis and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems. We provide some discussions about 
the lifecycle of trust relationships. The lifecycle of trust 
relationship includes the analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships, trust relationships at runtime, and the 
change management of trust relationships. We propose 
trust management architecture for the overall solution 
about trust issues in distributed information systems. The 
trust management architecture is currently at a high level. 
In real implementations, the properties of trust 
relationships discussed in this paper will be customized 
and configured based on the specific requirements. The 
definition of trust relationship provides a starting point 
and it is the cornerstone for our research about trust. The 
classification of trust relationships is helpful for better 
understanding of trust relationships. The guidelines for 
analysis and modeling of trust relationships provide high 
level guide to define a good set of trust relationships in 
distributed information systems. The operations on trust 
relationships and relative types of trust relationships 
provide terms and tools to concern the relations of trust 
relationships. The definitions about the properties of 
direction, symmetry, scope and diversity of trust 
relationships can provide suitable terms for the related 
properties and they can be used as tools for enabling the 
analysis and modeling of trust relationships in distributed 
information systems. The discussed lifecycle of trust 
relationships and proposed trust management architecture 
place the analysis and modeling of trust relationships 
under the background of trust management. 
Web services can be viewed as specific distributed 
information systems. In the web services paradigm, the 
proposed properties of trust relationships and the general 
methodology for analysis and modeling of trust 
relationships can provide solid foundation to understand 
and deal with trust related issues in WS-Trust, WS-
Security, WS-Policy and WS-Federation. 
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